Initial mental representations of design problems: Differences between experts and novices by Björklund, Tua A.
This is an electronic reprint of the original article.
This reprint may differ from the original in pagination and typographic detail.
Author(s): Björklund, Tua A.
Title: Initial mental representations of design problems: Differences
between experts and novices
Year: 2013
Version: Post print
Please cite the original version:
Björklund, Tua A. 2013. Initial mental representations of design problems: Differences
between experts and novices. Design Studies. Volume 34, Issue 2. 135-160. ISSN
0142-694X (printed). DOI: 10.1016/j.destud.2012.08.005.
Rights: © 2013 Elsevier BV. This is the post print version of the following article: Björklund, Tua A. 2013. Initial
mental representations of design problems: Differences between experts and novices. Design Studies.
Volume 34, Issue 2. 135-160. ISSN 0142-694X (printed). DOI: 10.1016/j.destud.2012.08.005, which has
been published in final form at http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0142694X12000609.
All material supplied via Aaltodoc is protected by copyright and other intellectual property rights, and
duplication or sale of all or part of any of the repository collections is not permitted, except that material may
be duplicated by you for your research use or educational purposes in electronic or print form. You must
obtain permission for any other use. Electronic or print copies may not be offered, whether for sale or
otherwise to anyone who is not an authorised user.
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
 1 
Initial mental representations of design problems: 
differences between experts and novices 
 
Tua A. Björklund 
Aalto University Design Factory, Finland 
 
Defining and structuring wicked design problems has a major influence on subsequent problem 
solving, and demands a considerable level of skill. Previous research on mental representations in 
design is scarce, and has been largely based on students or individual experts. This study explored the 
differences in the initial mental representations of real-life product development problems between 
advanced product development engineering students and recommended, professional experts. Expert 
mental representations were found to demonstrate superior extent, depth and level of detail, 
accommodating more interconnections and being more geared towards action. The results indicate that 
targeting relevancy perceptions to locate interconnections and promote proactivity can be a key factor 
in developing product development education to better match the requirements faced by professionals. 
 
Keywords: expertise, product development, design problems, design cognition, specification 
 
Expertise, i.e. superior performance in representative tasks in the field of expertise 
(Ericsson & Smith, 1991; Ericsson & Lehmann, 1996), has been studied in diverse 
domains and numerous professions, and systematic differences have long been 
demonstrated between expert and novice problem solving performance (Ericsson, et 
al., 2006; Chi, Glaser & Farr, 1988). However, limited research has been conducted 
on product development expertise (Cross, 2003; Defazio, 2008; Lawson, 2004), and 
in general, expertise and decision making research has tended to focus on fields with 
relatively well-defined problems, such as games and sports. While well-defined tasks 
are associated with a clear initial state, goal state, and set of rules (Reitman, 1965; 
Simon, 1973), many of the problem parameters are vague or unknown in the ill-
structured creative problems faced in creative knowledge work. Indeed, previous 
design researh has identified that it is not only the domain that distinguishes design 
from other fields, but also the process in which it is carried out (Gero, 1990). The 
design process seems to fundamentally differ from the scientific method (Lawson, 
1979). Whereas a strategy of analysis and synthesis works for well-defined problems 
(Reitman, 1965; Simon, 1973), the exploration process of ill-structured problems is 
targeted at both goal and decision variables (Gero, 1990). The problem must first be 
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transformed or structured into a clear mental representation of the current situation 
and goal state by the problem solver (Simon, 1973). In addition, fruitful actions need 
to be recognized from irrelevant ones from a seemingly unlimited pool of possible 
options (Schunn, McGregor & Saner, 2005). As creative knowledge-work 
professionals such as product developers need to routinely deal with these “messy 
situations” (Schön, 1983), how the problems are perceived and represented are of 
particular interest (Lawson, 2004).   
 
Coined as wicked problems in design literature (Rittel & Webber, 1973; Buchanan, 
1992), there is no “right” way to represent such vague problems. Rather the problem 
representation develops hand in hand with the solution, and the “information needed 
to understand the problem depends upon one's idea for solving it” (Rittel & Webber, 
1973, 161, italics original). How the problem is perceived influences which solutions 
are considered as relevant (Getzels, 1975), and thus finding the solution requires the 
problem to be formulated in a fruitful way (Getzels, 1979). Indeed, the creation or 
adaption of a fruitful frame has been indentified as a key practice in design and design 
thinking (Dorst, 2011; Paton & Dorst, 2010; Drews, 2009; Beckman & Barry, 2007), 
as well as in creative work in general (Hargadon & Bechky, 2006; Schank & Abelson, 
1977).  Framing refers to the creation of a standpoint from which a problem can be 
successfully tackled (Dorst, 2011), and requires a process of structuring and 
formulating the problem (Cross, 2004). Whereas design problems can have some 
inherent structure, for example in terms of the number of main issues or amount of 
dependencies between issues (Dorst, 1996), problem structuring refers to the 
psychological process of forming a mental, subjective representation reflecting the 
perceived problem state and desired outcome (Simon, 1973). The significance of the 
mental representation that is formed by the designer is further highlighted by the 
nature of design briefs in development work – at the starting point of a project, the 
client’s initial expression of the design problem is reframed by the product developer 
and the client in a process of briefing in order to create a fruitful and actionable view 
of the project (Schön & Wiggins, 1992; Valkenburg & Dorst, 1998; Hey, Joyce & 
Beckman, 2007; Paton & Dorst, 2010). In other words, designers must interpret the 
input they receive or collect regarding a design project in order to create a first 
representation of the problem at hand (Visser, 2006). As the requirements co-evolve 
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with the solution (Dorst & Cross, 2001; Kolodner & Willis, 1996; Suwa, Gero & 
Purcell, 2000) and affect its quality (Chakrabarti, Morgenstern, & Knaab, 2004; Walz, 
Elan, & Curtis, 1993), the first representation created by the product developer has a 
significant impact on the entire subsequent development project, and posits itself as 
both a meaningful and an intriguing research arena. However, despite the rise of 
expert mental representation research in other fields (Bläsing, Tenenbaum & Schack, 
2009), the majority of product development research has been able to provide limited 
insight on how the type of problems that development professionals face are 
successfully represented (Visser, 2006). Much empirical research on design has 
ignored considerations of expertise (Lawson, 2004), even though expertise is strongly 
associated with successful framing (Akin, 1990; Cross, 2004b; Lawson & Dorst, 
2009; Paton & Dorst, 2010). In fact, design research has tended to study either groups 
of design students (Defazio, 2008) or individual professional designers (Cross, 
2004b), working on simplified tasks and in simplified conditions (Lawson, 2004). 
This study aims to address this gap by exploring how expert and novice first mental 
problem representations differ from each other in product development, utilizing a 
novel, resource-efficient methodology for investigating real-life product development 
problems.  
 
1 Previous research on expert mental problem representations 
 
The study of mental representations has recently become a focal point in studying 
expertise and learning (Bläsing, Tenenbaum & Schack, 2009). Expertise is mediated 
by superior mental representations (Ericsson, 2003), which have a bidirectional 
relationship with knowledge (Alibali, Phillips & Fischer, 2009). In contrast to the 
external representations such as sketches and models utilized in design, mental 
representations are temporary internal cognitive structures modeling the problem 
(Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 1981; Dixon & Boncoddo, 2009) that are constructed 
implicitly and automaticly by the problem solver (Bickhard, 2001). Mental problem 
representations lie at the juncture of conceptual knowledge and procedural actions 
(Rittle-Johnson, Siegler & Alibali, 2001), allowing the selection and evaluation of 
effective information (Bläsing, Tenenbaum & Schack, 2009). Although there are 
numerous options in how any given design problem is represented, and how the 
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problem is mentally represented by the problem solver has a significant impact on 
subsequent solving efforts (Cross, 2004b; Gero, 1990; Rittel & Webber, 1973), there 
is little research conducted on constructing mental representations in design (Visser, 
2006).  
 
Numerous problem reconstruction and perception studies in many other fields of 
expertise have revealed that experts can better recall meaningful, relevant information 
in their domains (Chase & Simon, 1973; Charness, 1976; Randel, Pugh & Reed, 
1996; Smyth & Pendelton, 1994; Starkes, et al., 1987). These differences have been 
linked to larger integrated knowledge structures in the memory (Gobet, et al., 2001), 
demonstrated also by design experts (Popovic, 2004). In addition to differences in the 
extent of mental reprepresentations, information priorization seems to occur already 
on a perceptual level, as the location of attention has been demonstrated to vary 
between experts and novices in sports and games (De Groot & Gobet, 1996; Rowe & 
McKenna, 2001; Saariluoma, 1985). Systematic differences have also been found in 
how experts and novices group together presented problems, reflecting differences in 
the quality of the initial problem representations: Whereas novices focus on surface 
features (such as pulley problems in physics), experts group problems based on their 
deep structure, organizing problems with the same underlying principles together in 
physics (Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 1981), forming algorithms or data structures in 
programming (McKeithen, et al., 1981), and organizing diagnostic hypotheses 
according to major patho-physiological issues in medicine (Feltovich, et al., 1984; 
Johnson, et al., 1981). However, research has not yet tackled which features of 
product development problems capture experts’ attention, or if there are some specific 
characteristics in design mental representations (Visser, 2006). 
 
Futhermore, in addition to producing different mental problem representations, 
experts and novices also differ in the process of forming them. Here research in 
design expertise is more available. First of all, design experts are more cognitively 
active and productive compared to novices (Kavakli & Gero, 2001, 2002). A large 
amount of this greater cognitive activity is spent on understanding the initial, ill-
defined design specification and framing the problem (Goel & Pirolli, 1992; Cross, 
2004b). The process of problem framing or structuring may even take longer than 
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actually solving the structured problem (Simon, 1973). Designers tend to treat even 
more well-defined problems as if they were design problems, wanting to reframe 
them (Cross, 2007, Paton & Dorst, 2010). Indeed, in contrast to expertise in well-
defined problems, Cross (2004; Cross & Clayburn Cross, 1998) suggests that creative 
experts treat problems as harder than what novices do. For example, experts 
demonstrate a more comprehensive and higher level awareness of the contextual 
constraints of the problem (Eteläpelto, 2000). Experts in other fields also spend more 
time considering the information in the problem and are more likely to incorporate 
relevant knowledge (Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 1981). In addition, experts request 
higher-level task information than novices and are better able to predict what 
information they will need further on in the problem solving process in the field of 
finance (Hershey, et al., 1990). Design experts extensively utilize knowledge from 
previous projects (Ahmed, Wallace & Blessing, 2003; Cross, 2004a), spontaneously 
producing analogies to specific past cases whereas novices tend to use general 
principles (Ball, Ormerod & Morley, 2004).  More experienced design students gather 
and use more information related to the problem at hand (Atman, et al., 1999; 
Christiaans & Dorst, 1992; Cross, Christiaans & Dorst, 1994; Popovic, 2004), and 
design experts seem to approach the problem information more critically – unlike 
novices, experts question data, are aware of limitations and relationships between 
issues, and differentiate between important and less important issues (Ahmed, 
Wallace & Blessing, 2003). Also more successful design students make priority 
judgments early on (Christiaans & Dorst, 1992). In addition to evaluating the 
available information, design experts also tend to evaluate the solution more and 
earlier than novices (Ahmed, Wallace & Blessing, 2003; Ball, et al., 1997), and 
engage in more reflection in general (Schön, 1983; Crakett, 2004; Petre, 2004). 
Design experts engage in more problem decomposition, creating more sub-goals  
(Ball, et al., 1997) and using explicit problem decomposing strategies (Ho, 2001, 
based on a protocol study comparing a single expert and novice).  
 
Research in other fields of expertise further indicates that experts create mental 
representations that are more closely linked to subsequent action (Klein, 1998) and 
emphasize their own active role in information seeking, as opposed to novices 
perceiving themselves as passive recipients of information (Prince & Salas, 1998). 
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Thus one of the differences that can be expected to manifest between product 
development experts and novices is the display of differing levels of proactive 
behavior. Defined as taking anticipatory action to impact oneself or one’s 
environment (Grant & Ashford, 2008), proactive behavior is change-oriented 
(Bateman & Crant, 1993) and active (Crant, 2000) by nature. Given the recent 
demonstrations of the importance of proactivity for successful work behavior (Baer & 
Frese, 2003; Frese, et al., 2007; Koop, De Reu & Frese, 2000; Seibert, Crant & 
Kraimer, 1999) and innovativeness (Binnewies, Ohly & Sonnentag, 2007; Frese, 
Teng & Wijnen, 1999; Ohly, Sonnentag & Pluntke, 2006; Seibert, Kraimer & Crant, 
2001), proactiveness presents itself as a critical ingredient for success, especially in 
creative domains such as product development. Thus whether proactivity differences 
between experts and novices can be traced back to the initial mental representations or 
problem structuring and framing stage of product development problem solving 
becomes an interesting question. However, the connection between product 
development expertise and proactivity has not been studied, and little is known about 
the role of knowledge, skills and abilities in proactive behavior in any domain (Grant 
& Ashford, 2008; Crant, 2000).  
 
Finally, naturalistic decision making research suggests that expert responses are 
centered around recognizing or constructing adequate responses based on experience 
and critical features of the problem, rather than exhaustively analyzing options to 
produce normatively optimal responses (Klein, 1997a,b; Patel, Kaufman & Arocha, 
2002).  In this type of decision making, “the burden of difficulty is on assessing the 
nature of the situation rather than on comparing alternative courses of action” (Klein, 
1997, 341). Empirical support for the usage of such approaches has been gained from 
a variety of  time-critical professions (Carvalho, dos Santos & Vidal, 2005; Klein, 
1998; Klein, Calderwood & Clinton-Cirocco, 1989; Kushniruk, Patel & Fleiszer, 
1995), but Zannier, Chiasson and Maurer (2007) also found that the less structured a 
design problem was, the more the participants focused on naturalistic approaches to 
solving it. As a result, experts do not tend to consider more options than novices, but 
rather immediately produce higher quality options (Klein, et al., 1995; De Groot, 
1946/1978). Domain-based experience and the resulting well-developed schemas 
(abstract knowledge structures) enable experts to automatically recognize classes of 
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problems (Chi, Feltovich & Glaser, 1981) and patterns (Lesgold, et al., 1988), and 
directly produce reasonable options (Klein, et al., 1995). Also design experts have 
been demonstrated to automatically recognize familiar types of problems and 
solutions (Ball, Ormerod & Morley, 2004). In addition to considering a limited 
amount of options, experts in many fields seem to choose a preferred option rather 
early on (Joseph & Patel, 1990), with empirical results suggesting that experts possess 
adaptive developments supporting the recognition of patterns and preventing excess 
resource-consuming search through irrelevant information and false hypotheses 
(Patel, Kaufman & Arocha, 2002). Thus the importance of the initial mental 
representation formed in the beginning of problem solving process is further 
highlighted, especially in the case of fields with vague, ill-defined problems such as 
product development. 
 
After reviewing research on design expertise, Cross (2004) concludes that problem 
framing is frequently identified as a key feature of design expertise, and 
understanding the capacity of designers to create new frames is a key goal for current 
design research according to Dorst (2011). However, while it is clear that differences 
in problem framing exist between design experts and novices, many questions 
regarding the origins and significance of the few empirically observed differences 
remain. In addition to the general lack of research, the usage of students and 
individual professionals further limits the reliability of the obtained knowledge on the 
psychological processes of product development. As Lawson (2004, 457) states, “we 
should explore perception of design situations and in particular how they are 
recognised and classified”. In order to do this, this study further explores the very 
initial mental problem representations of expert product developers and product 
development students, aiming especially to identify any differences between the two 
groups when dealing with actual real-life design briefs instead of simplified well-







A total of seven product development experts (referred to as E1-E7) and seven 
product development students (referred to as N1-N7) took part in the study. The study 
participants were all Finnish, and all but one expert were male, minimizing 
differences resulting from factors unrelated to differences in the level of expertise. In 
the absence of objective criteria, such as Elo ratings in chess (Elo, 1978), social 
reputation and length of experience are typical identification criteria for experts (Chi, 
Glaser, & Farr, 1988). Thus the experts were chosen based on nominations from 
product development managers for especially capable product developers within their 
department (E1-E3) or from peers for especially capable, design award-winning 
product development colleagues (E4-E7). The expert participants came from two 
companies, both of which provided product development and design services for other 
organizations. The experts thus worked in partially or completely outsourced projects 
of varied companies, and had accrued experience from several fields. The experts had 
work experience in product development from 8 to 15 years, and all of them had 
participated in a minimum of 13 product development projects. The expert average of 
25 projects and 11 years of experience can be compared to Defazio’s (2008) 
minimum of 10 successful products or publications for design experts, or Ahmed, 
Wallace and Blessing’s (2003) minimum of 8 years of experience for experienced 
engineering designers. The ages of the experts ranged from 32 to 41, averaging at 36, 
whereas the ages of novices ranged from 24 to 29, averaging at 26 years.  
 
The novices in the study all had product development as their major subject in the 
same Finnish university of technology, and had a maximum of one year until their 
graduation. In order to ensure that the novices did not approach the experts in skill 
level, the amount of working experience was controlled. The novices reported having 
a minimum of 6 months of work experience, and having spent a maximum of three 
years as part-time workers in the field of product development (compare to, e.g., the 
limit of 2.5 years for novices in Ahmed, Wallace & Blessing, 2003).  
 
2.2 Testing materials 
 
In order to facilitate knowledge elicitation (Klein, Calderwood & MacGregor, 1989) 
and ensure that the expert participants could utilize their expertise (Ericsson, 2006b), 
 9 
the study aimed to investigate familiar, representative tasks of the domain. Data 
collection was built around five design briefs, comparable to the successful 
approaches of using clinical cases in studying medical expertise (e.g. Lesgold, et al., 
1988). The utilized five design briefs were based on five real product development 
cases from five different companies and five different projects. Generated test cases 
typically aim for being prototypical of the field, providing a range of difficulty, or 
providing a range of different types of cases (Hoffman, et al., 1995). This study aimed 
to provide a variety of types in order to ensure that the tasks represented the real 
projects faced by product developers in their professional life, and to improve 
generalizability to a wider range of physical product development tasks. The aim was 
to choose design briefs on products from varied fields, but nonetheless ones that were 
understandable even if the application area was unfamiliar. The five utilized design 
briefs regarded a polling booth for electric voting, a sauna safety device, a coffee 
package that is easier to open, a wireless charging device, and a bigger half-pipe 
grinder. All of the design briefs were approximately three fourths of an A4 page in 
length, with an average amount of 250 words (comparable to other design briefs used 
in previous research, such as Dorst and Cross’, 2001, 427, self-created design brief on 
a train litter-disposal system). The design briefs were in Finnish, the native tongue of 
the participants.  
 
2.3 Data collection 
 
Expert mental representations have been previously investigated in a number of ways, 
including recall tasks, perception tasks, and verbal reporting (Chi, 2006). One of the 
most common methods of studying expertise in general has been protocol analysis, a 
type of verbal reporting based on concurrent verbalization or thinking aloud while 
solving a problem (Ericsson, 2006a; Ericsson & Simon, 1993; Coley, Houseman & 
Roy, 2007; Houseman, Coley & Roy, 2008). However, solving product development 
problems typically require at least several weeks of work and collaboration with a 
wide host of different stakeholders and professionals. Indeed, many of the participant 
experts reported that their next step in proceeding with the design briefs would have 
been talking to other specialists, clients, or users. While protocol analysis in this case 
would have provided valuable information on the problem represention and solving 
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process if a realistic setting would have been provided, arranging several expert and 
novice participants to work for several weeks on the same problem would be 
extremely challenging. Thus rather than use unrealistically simple and well-defined 
problems, it was decided to utilize initial reflections of real product design problems 
prompted by means of interviewing the participants. Structured interviews are 
considered to provide a more systematic coverage of the domain (Cooke, 1994), and 
were consequently deemed more appropriate to investigate representational 
differences than unstructured interviews. In addition, structured interviews, in which 
the questions were always presented in the exact same order and form, ensured that 
any observed differences between the experts and novices were not prompted by the 
interviewer and allows for easier comparison between participants. While the choice 
of questions influences which result categories can be formed from the data, they 
however do not have an effect on the within category differences found in the data 
between the expert and novice participants. As standardized questions allow for more 
systematic and easier comparisons between the responses of different participants, the 
more constrained scope of possible answers was considered as an acceptable 
limitation. In order to minimize the constraints and make the questions applicable to 
all five design briefs, open-ended  (Shaw & Woodward, 1990) and generic (Hoffman, 
et al., 1995) interview questions were utilized. The following six questions were 
asked for each design brief: 
1. Describe in a few sentences what the design brief was about. 
2. Was there some information missing? If yes, what? 
3. Was there some needless information? If yes, what? 
4. What was important information? 
5. How would you continue from this point? 
6. Are there any problems or challenges to be expected?  
Comparable to the cognitive probe question of “What information did you use in 
making this decision, and how was it obtained?” utilized for eliciting knowledge in 
critical decision interviews (adopted in naturalistic decision making research; Klein, 
Calderwood & MacGregor, 1989), the questions probe both in an explicit fashion and 
in a more indirect manner for the information the participants include in their initial 
mental representations. Thus while previous studies have utilized problem 
reconstruction to study mental representations (e.g. Chase & Simon, 1973; Siegler, 
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1976), the questions of this study effectively deconstruct the problem. The six 
questions were deemed to provide sufficient details on the participants’ mental 
representations while limiting or directing the participants’ answers as little as 
possible to any particular set of knowledge or behavior in advance.  
 
Data were collected in 14 structured interviews, which were carried out individually 
and by the same interviewer. The interviews were held in Finnish, the mother tongue 
of the participants (therefore all the excerpts presented in this paper have been 
translated into English). The participants read the five design briefs, presented in a 
varied order, one at a time, and each design brief was followed by a structured 
interview of six questions. Although the participants were able to anticipate the 
interview questions after a few design briefs, there was no systematic increase or 
decrease in any result category according to the design brief presentation order. The 
participants were informed in advance that they could spend as much time as they 
wished with the design briefs and interview questions, and none voiced concerns 
during or after the interviews. In total, the interviews lasted from 30 to 66 minutes, the 
experts spending an average of 47 minutes and the novices an average of 37 minutes. 
Dealing with one design brief typically took the participants approximately one and a 
half minutes to read the design brief and four to six minutes to answer the interview 
questions. The interviews were audio-recorded. 
 
2.4 Analysis of the interviews 
 
The audio-recordings of the interviews were transcribed, after which every interview 
was segmented (Chi, 1997) into propositions, each of which was considered to 
represent a separate idea. The typical length of an individual segment was one 
sentence. In total, 1760 segments were produced by the participants.  
 
The coded segments of transcribed verbal reports can be judged for both content and 
frequency (Chi, 2006). When the interview questions do not restrict the content of the 
responses, analysis of the data can benefit from a data-driven, grounded approach 
(Cooke, 1999). Although grounded theory (Bryant & Charmaz, 2007) was not utilized 
in this study, as the purpose was not to develop new concepts or conceptual models, 
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bottom-up thematic coding was chosen in order to include any potential differences 
between the novices and experts, rather than to limit the focus on a predetermined set 
of representational aspects. Thus categories were created based on reoccurring themes 
in the problem-related knowledge types, such as identified sub-goals and 
requirements. A segment could belong to more than one category, for example the 
segment “And of course [it is a challenge], how an individual voter can be sure that 
the vote is recorded, that it’s recorded as it has been given” was classified as both a 
challenge and a new requirement for the end product or solution to fulfill. 
 
After all of the segments had been coded, similar codes were merged, and all of the 
segments were reanalyzed with the produced final list of categories. Only categories 
containing more than 15 segments were included in the analysis, thus producing 14 
main categories (see Table 1). Furthermore, subcategories (again, all containing more 
than 15 segments) were identified for three categories: important information, how to 
proceed with the problem, and defining the problem.  
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Table 1. Produced categories for the segments 
 










1. Missing    
    information 
Information identified as 
missing or needed in order 
to continue working on the 
case, questions about the 
product 
" I don't know, this didn't say, are 
the competitors' product patented, 
so that that's why they can't be 
copied, or do they just not want to 
make the same kind." (E3) 
2. Important  
    information 
Information explicitly 
identified as important by 
the participant 
 
a. feature or 
quality of the 
product 
a feature or quality of the 
product mentioned in the 
design brief 
"it needs to be cheap." (N5) 
b. other 
information in the 
design brief 
information aside from 
product features or qualities 
stated in the design brief  
"And that size of the largest list of 
candidates (ballot) is essential.” 
(E5)  
c. deduced context information regarding the 
context of the project, 
deduced by the participant 
"That it is likely a pretty small 
sample, to base the development 
on.”(E7) 
3. Outside  
    information 
Utilization of information 
not found in the design brief 
(personal experiences or 
know-ledge of the world) 
"And as at the same time 
especially the voting enthusiasm 
of the youth is pretty low, it could 
actually be quite good to freshen 
up the voting environment a bit.” 
(E6)  











4. Definition Defining or limiting the 
problem-space 
 
a. product related to the product "This probably... likely these are 
targeted for private apartments." 
(E1) 
b. project related to the project "This would be a technology 
development project, if it were 
initiated." (E3) 
5. New  
    requirement 
Identifying a new 
requirement (not mentioned 
in the design brief) for the 
product 
"Electronic voting, so places for 
power sources (outlets) are 
required there.” (E5)  
6. Sub-goal Identifying a sub-goal "We would need to keep the 
centre of gravity a bit lower and 
more to the centre." (E1) 
7. Initial idea    
    generation 
Developing or mentioning 
some specific ideas for the 
product 
"Maybe you could ease the 
opening by some small extra 
material slip, make a better grip, 




















8. Specific source  
    of information 
A specific source of 
knowledge or information 
identified 
" And insurance companies. They 
could surely provide information 
on sauna fires, how they have 
begun." (E2) 
9. What next Explicit statements of what 
the participant would do 
next 
 
a. generic of a generic nature (I would) "...set up  meeting with 
the client" (N5) 
b. case- specific specific to the project at 
hand, more detailed 
"I would go watch in the field 
when they [snowboarders] make 
them [half-pipes] entirely by 
hand." (N1) 
10. Project     
      evaluation 
 
Evaluating the project (or 
the information in the 
design brief) 
"This was more, just gather the 
people and start doing. Very 
simple thing, that you surely can 
vary easily enough options." (N5) 
11. Challenges Identified challenges 
relating to the product 
development problem and 
project 














12. Design brief  
      text evaluation 
Evaluating the form or 
presentation style of the 
design brief 
"It could be better structured, that, 
in what order the information is 
presented." (N6) 
13. Needless  
      information 
Information presented in the 
design brief but explicitly 
identified as useless by the 
participant 
"There are these appendices of the 
sizes of the candidate lists." 
(…that I wouldn’t need) (N1) 
14. Task  
      clarification  
      questions 
Problem perceived as 
unclear, answers to 
questions sought from the 
client 
(I would need to...) "discuss a bit, 




The 14 categories could be grouped into four larger classes: all of the categories were 
related to either needed (or used) information, problem structuring, the problem 
solving process or the presentation of the problem.  
 
Due to the aim of the study, differences between experts and novices across the 
resulting categories (problem knowledge dimensions) were of more interest than the 
themes of the categories as such (indeed, any amount of different coding schemes 
might have been developed from the same data). The amount of segments that each 
participant had produced to each class was counted, omitting segments in which a 
participant repeated the comment within the same design brief discussion. However, 
repetition across different design briefs was not controlled in order to improve the 
reliability of the results by giving less emphasis to features that emerged only in 
relation to a particular design brief. Thus the amount of segments in a category reflect 
the amount of distinct ideas expressed by the participant in relation to each of the five 
design briefs, giving an overall view of all of five the representations. 
 
2.5 Statistical methods 
 
To analyze the reliability of classification, an independent coder re-classified 10% of 
the segments (interview sections regarding design brief 5). Inter-coder reliability 
(Cohen’s Kappa) was calculated separately for each category. The values of Kappa 
for all the categories and subcategories ranged from 0.86 to 1, which was considered 
satisfactory.  
 
A two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test was used to assess the significance of the 
differences in the total number of segments in Classes I-IV between experts and 
novices. The resulting p-values were adjusted for multiple comparisons by the 
Bonferroni method; i.e., since four pairwise tests were performed, the p values were 







The total amount of segments produced by expert participants ranged from 109 to 
297, whereas novices produced 61 to 97 segments in total. No design brief elicited 
systematically more or less segments from the participants, and, furthermore, the total 
of segments elicited by each design brief was of similar magnitude. The study did not 
allow for any conclusive findings on the effect of the presentation order of the design 
briefs. 
 
On the average, experts produced more segments that novices (34.1 vs. 16.2 per 
design brief, respectively). Productivity differences became even more marked when 
segments related to the presentation of the problem (class IV) were considered 
separately. Segments in classes I to III, identifying needed information, structuring the 
problem and regarding the solving process, were directly related to the problem at 
hand, and could be considered as productive, and the experts had higher amounts of 
segments in each category of these classes (see Table 2). On the other hand, the 
productivity of evaluating the presentation of the design brief (class IV) was 
questionable. Experts spent only 13 out of 1192 (1,1%) segments to class IV, whereas 
novices spent an average of 8.1% of their segments in the class.  
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Table 2. The number of segments belonging to each class produced by experts and 
novices. 
Class Category 












1. Missing information 28.6 (15.1) 10.4 (5.1) 
2. Important information 18.9 (8.9) 11.7 (2.7) 
    a. feature or quality of the product 4.7 (2.6) 3.9 (3.4) 
    b. other information of the product 7.0 (4.9) 7.4 (2.9) 
    c. deduced context 8.7 (3.8) 0.4 (0.5) 
3. Outside information 10.3 (10.0) 2.7 (2.1) 











4. Definition 12.0 (7.1) 4.0 (4.5) 
    a. product 6.9 (4.9) 1.7 (3.3) 
    b. project 5.1 (4.9) 2.3 (2.0) 
5. New requirement 7.1 (5.6) 1.6 (1.9) 
6. Sub-goal 3.9 (4.0) 0.9 (1.2) 
7. Initial idea generation 9.4 (10.3) 3.0 (4.2) 







8. Specific source of information 5.1 (3.4) 0.9 (0.7) 
9. What next 14.7 (6.4) 9.9 (3.1) 
    a. generic 6.0 (2.8) 5.3 (2.7) 
    b. case-specific 8.7 (5.1) 4.6 (2.1) 
10. Project evaluation 17.4 (14.1) 7.0 (5.6) 
11. Challenges 15.3 (8.3) 8.0 (4.1) 












 12. Design brief text evaluation 0.7 (1.1) 1.6 (2.)3 
13. Needless information 1.0 (1.8) 2.3 (1.4) 
14. Task clarification questions 0.0 (0.0) 2.7 (2.8) 
Total 1.7 (2.1) 6.6 (5.4) 
Segments in total1 170.3 (65.6) 81.1 (12.3) 
 
1 including repeated segments and the segments that did not fit the final 14 categories	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Class I – Needed information 
 
Experts had an average of 57.7 segments in the first class, identifying needed 
information, compared to the novice average of 24.9 segments (p=0.004; statistically 
significant after adjustment for multiple comparisons). The largest category of the 
class, missing information, contained segments that were questions and identified 
information as missing or needed in order to continue working on the case, where the 
participant had an active role in finding the information – as opposed to category 14, 
which contained questions to which the design brief provider was expected to find the 
answer. In the missing information category, experts had an average of 28.6 segments 
(range 13 to 48), whereas novices only had an average of 10.4 segments (range 4 to 
17). For example in the case of the half-pipe grinder, the most common items 
identified as missing by the experts were more specific measurements (E1, E3, E4, 
E5, and E6), information on the attachment of the device to the operating machine 
(E1, E2, E3, E5, and E6), information on the half-pipe (E2, E3, and E6) and further 
information on the content of the mentioned FIS-standard (E1, E4, and E7). The 
novice segment content was much more limited, but did include some of the questions 
raised by the experts as well (N3 and N7 on the measurements, N1 and N3 on the 
attachment, and N1, N6 and N7 on the half-pipe). 
 
In addition to experts producing more segments regarding missing information, a 
difference in the level of processing could be detected in information explicitly 
identified as important by the participants (category 2). Experts identified deduced 
context information as important from 3 to 13 times, while the seven novices made 
only three such statements in total. For example, expert 3 commented that the most 
important thing to know in one design brief was that “it’s only in deliberation, the 
bill, so there isn’t yet any defined setting to make it [the electronic polling booth] 
into” and in the case of sauna safety solutions that the product was to be made "to a 
different use and a different environment, but that it's not... there already exists some 
kind of technology, so we're not starting from zero". This can be contrasted to the 
other two important information subcategories, which contained information on the 
product or context mentioned already in the design brief. In the case of coffee 
packages, for example, the most common aspects identified as important in these 
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subcategories were that the price should not increase (E1, E3, E5, E6, N3, and N7), 
the package should be easy to open (E2, E3, E6, N1, N5, and N6), have good 
logistical qualities (E3, E6, N1, and N7) and take into account coffee preservation 
considerations (E6, N1, N6, and N7). 
 
Experts also had a higher average of segments referring to knowledge not included in 
the design brief, or outside information (10.3 vs. 2.7, category 3).  Both novices and 
experts referred to outside knowledge of the product, its usage and its context – for 
example voting systems in Finland and elsewhere (N4, N6, E3), and current 
discussions in Finland about the possibility of voting at home (N7) and the low voting 
percentage of youth (E6).  Both groups also referred to general outside knowledge, 
such as material prices (N6), design for all principles (N5), software functioning 
principles (E3) and physics (E5). However, experts also had several references to 
product development project experiences and utilized knowledge on analogous 
products instead of just knowledge on the target product and environment: paint tins 
were compared to coffee packages (E6), chain saws to the half-pipe grinder (E5), 
electric tooth brushes in wireless charging (E3), and phone booths, flap charts, 
lecterns and ATMs were drawn on in the case of electronic voting booths (E3, E5, and 
E6). 
 
Class II – Problem structuring 
 
Experts had more segments than novices on problem structuring (class II, p=.017; not 
statistically significant after adjustment) and each of the related categories.  The most 
marked difference between novices and experts within the class of problem 
structuring was found in the number of new requirements identified (category 5): 
experts had an average of 7.1 new requirements, whereas novices only had an average 
of 1.6 new requirements. Both experts and novices had physical requirements for the 
products, such as small size for the wireless charging solution (E1 and E3) and for the 
sauna safety device (N2 and N6). However, numerous expert requirements were 
related to the appearance of the product (especially the wireless charging solution; E1, 
E3, E6, and E7) and to the compatibility of the solution with other products and 
environments (E1, E2, E3, E6, and E7), whereas the novices produced no such 
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requirements. Furthermore, all of the experts had at least one requirement related to 
the use or context of the product, such as increasing production speed in the case of 
coffee packages (E5) and fulfilling snowboard competition requirements in the half-
pipe shape (E3), whereas only three novices produced such segments. 
 
Experts had more segments in the largest problem structuring category, defining the 
problem at hand, producing an average of 12.0 compared to 4.0 segments in category 
4. For example, E7 concluded that the electronic polling booth design task was 
limited to the polling booth (rather than including the electronic voting system), and 
E5 came to the conclusion that the total system would weigh approximately 50 
kilograms. In addition, all experts identified at least one sub-goal (category 6), 
whereas four novices had no segments in this category. Both experts and novices 
identified sub-goals that were related to both the product and the project aspects of the 
design brief, although experts had some sub-goals that were more specific. For 
example, the E1 would have first determined the required amount of coolant in the 
sauna safety system, measured the required opening strength and determined an 
acceptable level in the easy-to-open coffee packages, and aimed to increase the 
bearing capacity without increasing material amount in the half-pipe grinder. These 
can be contrasted with the six novice segments in the category: determining what the 
intelligent system would monitor and what would trigger it in the sauna safety system 
(N1), designing a new structure (N2) for the half-pipe grinder, and in the case of 
wireless charging, promoting collaboration with device manufacturers (N1) and mid-
size furniture companies (N3), and determining the driving force (e.g. furniture 
companies, cell phone manufacturers) on the market (N4).  
 
Experts had a higher average of idea generation segments (category 7). There was 
also a qualitative difference between the experts’ idea generation and that of the 
novice producing the highest amount of idea generation segments, N5. Unlike the 
experts, N5 did not generate ideas based on the goals and requirements set by the 
design brief, but from what he felt was a more fruitful viewpoint or goal. Thus 
whereas he can be said to have engaged in problem structuring in the initial idea 
generation, the clients’ (design brief point-of-view) needs and requirements were not 
taken into consideration.  
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Class III – Process 
 
The experts had more process-related segments than the novices (class III, p=.017; 
not statistically significant after adjustment). Experts identified an average of 5.1 
sources for information and potentially needed collaborators (category 8), whereas 
novices identified either none or only one. Furthermore, the majority of expert 
segments regarded bringing the input from a variety of product development related 
professionals: industrial designers (E1, E4, and E7), usability specialists (E4 and E7), 
electricity-related professionals (E1, E4), interior designers (E3), architects (E3), 
strength calculators (E6), “machinery people” (E4), engineers (E6) and a expert in 
electronic safety systems (E6). The novices, on the other hand, did not refer to any 
other development specialists, but both experts and novices would have consulted 
stakeholders related to the manufacturing (N6, E1, and E3), and the use of the product 
(N2, N3, and E5). A few references were also made to other outside information 
sources in both groups – insurance companies (E2), rescue departments (E2), machine 
design standards (E4) and sauna fire case reports (E7) in the case of experts, and 
voting laws in the case of novices (N3 and N7). 
 
The experts identified an average of 15.2 challenges that they might encounter in the 
project proposed by the design brief, compared to the average of 8 challenges 
identified by novices. As in the information identified as important, indication of 
differences in the level of processing could be detected in the identified challenges. 
The novice-identified challenges were directly related to the design problem and the 
context, such as compatibility with different saunas (N1), rough weather-conditions 
(N2), gaining partners (N3), and changing a highly optimized process without 
changing anything (N5), types of challenges that were also found in the expert 
segments. However, all experts had also challenges resulting from the consequences 
of development requirements or scope decisions, such as “if you try to make a version 
[of the electronic polling booth] for the bus, it probably would require a detachable 
bottom or else, that you would need to be able to unfasten parts, but that easily makes 
it [the solution] too complicated”. The novices had no such statements.  
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A similar difference in processing level could also be detected in how to proceed with 
the projects: the experts were more customized in their proposed proceedings 
(subcategory 9b). For example, E5 would have gathered a bunch of batteries and 
familiarized himself with them in the case of wireless charging, whereas the more 
general subcategory 9a included more vague plans such as checking out competitors 
(N1, N3, N4 and N6). 
 
Class IV – Presentation of the problem 
 
Unlike in the previous three classes, novices produced more segments regarding the 
presentation of the development problem than experts (class IV, p=.026; not 
statistically significant after adjustment). The experts had no task clarification 
questions (category 14), whereas all but one novice had at least one, and up to eight, 
segments. One task clarification question was targeted at the electronic voting booth 
(N5), four questions were targeted at the sauna safety solution (N5 and N7) and 
wireless charging solution (N4, N5, and N7), each, and five questions were targeted at 
both the half-pipe grinder (N4, N5 and N6) and the coffee package design brief (N2, 
N3, N4, and N7). The questions were targeted towards the nature and extent of the 
desired solution and to the relative priorities of the expressed requests, for example 
that the design brief had “requirements in so many directions, so they could express a 
lot better, that what are the most relevant things and which are less relevant” (N6), 
and “what is the most biggest problem, is it the opening or the re-closing, or is it that 
the vacuum can break and the coffee goes bad, which one of them is the most 
important [problem] ” (N2). 
 
Novices also had a higher average of segments evaluating the design brief 
presentation and explicitly identifying irrelevant information (categories 12 and 13). 
Only three experts and three novices offered an evaluation of the design brief texts 
(category 12), and these segments were mainly targeted at the design briefs of the 
sauna safety solution, the coffee package and the wireless charging solution (each 
receiving four mentions). The experts criticized the informal tone of the sauna safety 
solution (E5), and the tone and terminology of the wireless charging solution (E6 and 
E7). The novices, on the other hand, produced some evaluating segments in relation 
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each design brief, criticizing for example their emphasis on background information 
(N7) and poor structure (N5 and N6). The novices also found something needless 
(category 13) in each design brief, typically too detailed information. The majority of 
segments were related to the electronic voting booth, sauna safety solution and 
wireless charging solutions. Expert 5 found a few details in the voting booth and 
sauna safety solution needless, and would have preferred more requirement 
information related to the products themselves, and several novices found needless 
information in these design briefs as well (N2, N3, N4 and N7). Experts 3 and 4 on 
the other hand found the wireless charging solution design brief to present too much 




 4 Discussion 
 
Representations have a key role in design, and learning to construct, interpret and use 
different types of representations is an essential part of design education (Visser, 
2006, 225). As expertise can be achieved through deliberate practice (Ericsson & 
Lehmann, 1996), differences in how expert product developers and shortly graduating 
product development students approach problems can provide useful guidance for 
training in both educational institutes and organizations. Identifying underlying 
cognitive processes and skills allows targeting deliberate practice efforts, and new 
problem solving strategies can improve mental problem representations (Alibali, 
Ockuly & Fischer, 2009). Meta-cognitive strategies (Cohen, Freeman & Thompson, 
1997), critical cues (Klein & Wolf, 1995) and studying expert problem solving 
cognitions (Abernathy & Hamm, 1995) can also assist novices in their development 
towards expertise. Aiming to explore differences in the mental representations of real 
product development problems, the design brief interpretations of seven experts and 
seven novices were investigated in this study. While the limited amount and type of 
participants and design tasks utilized in the study certainly cautions against freely 
generalizing the results across different fields, the novel and resource-efficient task 
was able to reveal several differences between the experts and novices.  
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The results suggest that product development experts do indeed view problems as 
harder than novices (Cross, 2004), in the sense that experts reported needing more 
information in order to tackle the presented problems successfully. As could be 
expected (Kavakli & Gero, 2001, 2002), the experts were more productive, producing 
much higer amounts of segments than novices, even though both groups were 
promted by the exact same stimuli. In addition to sheer volume differences, the expert 
segments also demonstrated more depth and width in the scope of their mental 
representations. The experts perceived a wider range of requirements and drew from a 
wider range of outside information in their reflections. Previous studies suggest that 
such differences begin to manifest early on in the learning process, as already more 
experienced design students cover a larger portion of the problem-definition space 
and use more information (e.g. Adams, Turns & Atman, 2003; Atman, et al., 1999; 
Popovic, 2004). 
 
In fact, the results indicate that experts accommodate for a higher degree of 
interconnections both within the mental representations and between the problem 
representations and outside knowledge. The experts reported deduced context 
information as highly significant for solving the problems, and identified challenges 
resulting from the scope and requirement decisions of the design briefs (i.e. making 
interconnections within the problem information). Furthermore, only experts were 
found to utilize infromation from previous projects and analogous products, novices 
were limited to the target product context in connecting the problem at hand to 
previous knowledge. These results concur with previous design studies reporting 
increased awareness of contextual constraints (Eteläpelto, 2000), and utilization of 
previous and analogous experiences (Ahmed, Wallace & Blessing, 2003; Ball, 
Ormerod & Morley, 2004; Cross, 2004a; Visser, 1995) in the design problem solving 
processes of experts. The findings of this study suggests that a possible source for the 
observed differences in the depth and detail lies in more developed relevancy 
perceptions and perceptions of interconnections in the problem representations of 
design experts. As relevancy perceptions involve judging the importance of a piece of 
information, evaluating how promising the implied direction is (Bereiter & 
Scardamalia, 1993) and choosing the appropriate level of abstraction that should be 
utilized in solving the problem (Feltovich, Prietula & Ericsson, 2006), they can 
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determine which pieces of information seem connected to eachother. Similar findings 
of the importance of interconnections have been obtained by Randel, Pugh and Reed 
(1996) in the field of electronic warfare, noting that while low and high performers 
did not significantly differ in the considered cues, knowledge and imagery, the more 
skilled participants “put these elements together” or integrated them in a superior 
manner. As previous research has demonstrated mental problem representations to be 
influenced by strategies and actions taken during the problem solving process 
(Alibali, Ockuly & Fischer, 2009; Dixon & Boncoddo, 2009), explicitly instructing 
novice product developers to pay more attention to the interconnections, 
consequences and context of the problem as a meta-cognitive strategy (Cohen, 
Freeman & Thompson, 1997) might help them to develop more effective mental 
problem representations. 
 
Furthermore, the findings also indicate that experts are able to identify more points of 
leverage for solving the design problems. The experts created more numerous and 
specific sub-goals, as well as more specific and customized plans for proceeding with 
the problem solving. They also utilized a wider array of outside information sources, 
and frequently reported that they would consult or collaborate with other development 
professionals in specific matters of the project (the importance of which Visser, 1995, 
has demonstrated in the actual process of expert design problem solving). Indeed, the 
experts seemed to be much more attuned to the information needs they would face in 
subsequent solving efforts and how to tackle these needs. In addition, the experts 
restricted their efforts towards solving the problem, i.e. productive work, whereas 
novices spent a proportion of their already more limited activity on evaluating the 
presentation of the problem. Similar results on the focus of activity have been 
previously obtained in software design, where moderate performers produce more 
task-irrelevant cognitions than high performers (Sonnentag, 1998). Finally, only 
novices seemed to demand ready answers for their questions from the clients, whereas 
experts saw themselves as having more active roles in seeking the needed 
information, identifying both more information needs and more information sources.  
 
Previous research in other fields has demonstrated experts to be more active in 
information gathering (Prince & Salas, 1998) and situational awareness (Endsley, 
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2006) in the actual problem solving process, and the passive-active distinction can 
also be found in learning foci (Cleary & Zimmerman, 2001). The results of this study 
demonstrate a more proactive stance towards the problem solving process already in 
the mental problem representation and structuring stage. As little is known about the 
role of knowledge, skills and abilities in proactive behavior (Grant & Ashford, 2008; 
Crant, 2000), such a finding is a significant one. The mental representation of the 
problem has key implications for subsequent action, as more comprehensive mental 
representation of the problem at hand increases the likelihood of proactive behavior 
via increasing the amount of identified options and opportunities. As more advanced 
mental representations allow high performers to identify better points of leverage and 
to target their efforts toward more fruitful actions, they can also favorably affect the 
the impact of any pursued proactive behavior. This can produce a virtuous cycle of 
increasing proactivity where initial success further encourages more proactive 
behavior, as self-efficacy, the belief in the successful impact of one’s efforts, has been 
found to be an important antecedent for proactive behavior (Grant & Ashford, 2008; 
Parker, Williams & Turner, 2006; Frese, Garst & Fay, 2007; Frese & Fay, 2001). 
While further experiments with larger participant sample sizes will provide valuable 
insights regarding the magnitude and statistical significance of the observed expert-
novice differences, the present results suggest that not only do better initial mental 
problem representations have a direct impact on development expertise, but they also 
promote successful problem solving via increased proactivity. On the other hand, the 
frequent passiveness demonstrated by novices should be alarming for educators 
aiming to train successful professionals, as proactivity is becoming a key requirement 




The difficulty of solving ill-structured design problems often lies in operationalizing 
the initially vague problem and creating fruitful problem solving actions. Although 
there is widespread agreement on the significance of the initial mental representation 
or successfully framing of the problem on subsequent performance, little is yet known 
about mental representations in product development. Furthermore, much research on 
product development problem solving has been based on studying the behavior of 
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design students or, at best, individual designers (Cross, 2003; Cross, 2004b; Defazio, 
2008). This study addresses the gap in knowledge by exploring the differences in 
initial mental problem representations and reflections on real-life product 
development problems between advanced product development students and 
recommended, professional product development experts. The results reveal that 
experts have superior extent, depth and detail in their representations, accommodate 
for more interconnections both within the problem information and between the 
problem and previous knowledge, and approach the problem in a more proactive 
manner. Design experts seem to perceive both more information needs and more 
information sources relevant to the problem at hand. Thus the results of this study 
indicate that forming comprehensive mental representations based on wide relevancy 
perceptions should be considered as a performance and proactivity enhancer in design 
along with previously identified cognitive-motivational issues. Especially 
accommodating for interconnections in the mental representations offers a promising 
venue for further research on promoting product development expertise and 
proactivity in solving product development problems – in other words, increasing 
both the capability to address professional problems successfully, and the tendency to 
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